Systems of service: reflections on the moral foundations of improvement by Davidoff, Frank
Systems of service: reﬂections on the
moral foundations of improvement
Frank Davidoff
ABSTRACT
Providing clinical care is above all a service; in that
sense, the medical profession aspires to Aristotelian
phronesis, or prudencedbeing ‘capable of action with
regard to things that are good and bad for man.’ This
intense commitment to service encourages healthcare
providers to gravitate towards one or another
epistemology as their preferred moral pathway to
better care. One such epistemology, the ‘snail’
perspective, places particular value on knowing
whether newly devised clinical interventions are both
effective and safe before applying them, mainly
through rigorous experimental (deductive) studies,
which contribute to the body of established scientiﬁc
knowledge (episteme). Another (the ‘evangelist’
perspective) places particular value on the experiential
learning gained from applying new clinical
interventions, which contributes to professional
know-how (techne). From the ‘snail’ point of view,
implementing clinical interventions before their
efﬁcacy and safety are rigorously established is
morally suspect because it can result in ineffective,
wasteful and potentially harmful actions. Conversely,
from the ‘evangelist’ point of view, demanding ‘hard’
proof of efﬁcacy and safety before implementing
every intervention is morally suspect because it can
delay and obstruct the on-the-ground learning seen as
being urgently needed to ﬁx ineffective, inefﬁcient and
sometimes dangerous existing clinical practices. Two
different moral syndromesdsets of interlocked
valuesdunderlie these perspectives; both are arguably
essential for better care. Although it is not clear how
best to leverage their combined strengths, a true
symbiotic relationship between the two appears to be
developing, one that leaves the two syndromes intact
but softens their epistemological edges and supports
active, close, respectful interaction between them.
INTRODUCTION
The order of Knights Hospitallers, founded
in the 11th century, provided hostels for
pilgrims to the Holy Land, and cared for the
sick among them; their Hotels-Dieu were
important precursors of modern hospitals.
1
Every brother, at his induction into the
Knights, recited this vow from the earliest
rule of the Order: ‘The brethren of the
Hospital should serve our Lords, the sick,
with zeal and devotion, as if they were serfs to
their Lords.’
Although healthcare providers have moved
away over the centuries from this constrained
and righteous vision of its purpose, medicine
remains above all a service profession. As
such, it is concerned primarily with what
Aristotle called phronesis: prudence, or the
practical wisdom that renders people and
organisations ‘capable of action with regard
to things that are good and bad for man.’
2
Four widely accepted ethical principles
frame medicine’s approach to the realisation
of phronesis: do no harm (non-maleﬁcence);
improve patients’ well-being (beneﬁcence);
be patient-centred (respect and preserve
patient autonomy); and deliver care even-
handedly (justice). Although virtually
everyone agrees that these precepts are
necessary, the history of medicine also makes
it clear that they are not sufﬁcient. For
example, Western doctors believed for
millennia that bloodletting was beneﬁcial and
was not harmful; they practised it widely until
the 19th century when Pierre Louis in Paris,
using la methode numerique, demonstrated that
bleeding not only failed to cure patients but
also harmed and sometimes even killed them.
What was missing from medicine’s moral
code was a ﬁfth ethical principle now recog-
nised as a central element of all profession-
alism, namely, ‘unceasing movement towards
new levels of performance’din a word,
improvement.
3 Atsomelevel, all professionals
connected with healthcare accept this prin-
ciple, and over time the practice of clinical
medicine has, of course, changed dramati-
cally, mostly (although not always) for the
better. The touchstone of these improve-
ments has unarguably been the increase in
both basic science and clinical knowledge.
The epistemology of basic science is in itself
quite complicated, but the generation of
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The structure of improvement knowledgeclinically useful knowledge is even more complicated, not
least because it consists of two very different components.
The ﬁrst is knowing the right thing to dodthat is,
knowing whether clinical interventions actually work; the
abstract conceptual knowledge, invariable in time and
space, that Aristotle referred to as episteme. The second is
knowing how to do things rightdthat is, the concrete,
variable, time- and context-dependent know-how (or
competence) that Aristotle referred to as techne.
TWO MORAL SYNDROMES
Each of these ways of knowing has its dedicated adher-
ents who differ in what they see as the most appropriate
way for medicine to meet its moral obligation of
continuous movement to new levels of performance.
The depth of feeling sometimes expressed over these
differences suggests that the psychological forces at work
go beyond the strictly intellectual, and are closer to the
righteousness associated with moral positions. Stated
differently, each perspective seems convinced that its
concepts and methods provide the true or, at least, more
moral path to better medical care.
These two moral perspectives are not new; they have
appeared in various guises for centuries, in philosophy,
natural sciences, psychology, statistics and elsewhere. For
example, natural scientists have long seen the methods
of social science as lacking true scientiﬁc validity, in
particular since social sciences have difﬁculty in
producing veriﬁable theoretical predictions. As recently
as 1996, the longstanding differences between these
moral positions erupted into the so-called ‘science wars,’
in which natural scientists publicly questioned whether
social science leads to ‘dangerous antirationalism and
relativism.’ The struggle continues to this day.
2
In medicine, Sackett and Holland suggested some
35 years ago that the controversy brewing over the then-
emerging approaches to screening for disease stemmed
from fundamental ideological differences between
‘advocates’ and ‘methodologists’ or, as they later
referred to them, ‘evangelists’ and ‘snails.’
4 Evangelists,
in these authors’ view, held that:
‘the pre-existing evidence plus common sensedin the face
of the ongoing toll of disability and untimely
deathddemand massive screening programs for the
detectionofcitizenswithriskfactorsforthesedisordersnow,
even in the absence of experiments to determine whether
the alteration of many risk factors will, in fact, alter risk.’
Snails, on the other hand, were equally convinced that:
‘screening, like any other untested health maneuver, may
do more harm than good and must meet scientiﬁc as well
as political criteria before it is implemented.’
In short, the evangelist perspective suggests that under
conditions of uncertainty it can be morally justiﬁable to
‘Just do it, and learn as you go,’ while from the snail
point of view, the more moral approach when faced by
uncertainty is ‘Look before you leap;’ the difference
between ‘action’ and ‘caution.’
5
The essential moral difference between these two
epistemologies comes into sharper focus when consid-
ering what each sees as the other’s failings, rather than
what each senses as its own correctness. Thus, evangelists
consider the snail demand for ‘hard’ proof of efﬁcacy
and safety as a precondition for putting a new clinical
intervention into practice as morally unjustiﬁed precisely
because obtaining ‘sufﬁcient’ proof can delay and
obstruct the actions seen as urgently needed to ﬁx
ineffective, inefﬁcient, and sometimes harmful, or even
lethal, existing care systems. Conversely, snails consider
the evangelist insistence on implementing innovative
medical procedures before their efﬁcacy and safety are
established as morally unjustiﬁed precisely because even
reasonable-seeming interventions can waste scarce
resources, introduce ineffective, inefﬁcient and poten-
tially even harmful changes in care, and generate serious
opportunity costs.
It also helps to understand the differences between
evangelist and snail epistemologies by thinking of them
in terms of two contrasting ‘moral syndromes.’ The
concept of moral syndromes was introduced in 1992 by
the scholar and critic Jane Jacobs
6 in arguing her thesis
that two sets of moral preceptsddrivers of desirable or
acceptable actionsdgovern the two disparate ways of
surviving in public life. She saw these two ‘systems of
survival’ as taking (as in governmentdthink taxes; the
churchdthink tithes; and the militarydthink conquest)
and trading (as in businessdthink investment, contracts,
market value and customer satisfaction). She labelled
the tightly integrated sets of moral precepts that
underlie these two systems as the guardian and
commercial moral syndromes (table 1).
Two analogous moral syndromes underlie what might
be called medicine’s ‘systems of service’ (table 2).
Although the two share a focus on learning, each set of
precepts stands in direct contrast to the other, a point-
counterpoint that primarily reﬂects differences between
the two fundamental modes of scientiﬁc learning:
evangelists tend to rely on inductive learning, largely by
observation and replication (conﬁrmation), while snails
tend to learn deductively, largely by hypothesis testing
(experimental evaluation).
78
It is more than coincidental, therefore, that the moral
differences between evangelist and snail perspectives
ﬁnd an echo in the more pragmatic ‘loss functions’
associated with deductive and inductive reasoning.
7
Thus, loss of observational research is seen as not
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The structure of improvement knowledgereasonable, since it would limit our ability to discover
new phenomena, mechanisms and causal models; after
all, ‘every discovery contains an “irrational element,” or
“a creative intuition”,’
9 and testable hypotheses have to
come from somewhere. Conversely, loss of hypothesis
testing through experimental studies is seen as not
reasonable, since ineffective or unsafe clinical measures
would be used instead of rejected.
ENTER THE SCIENCE OF IMPROVEMENT
The emergence of a science of improvement within
medicine in the last few decades has ampliﬁed the
differences between the two epistemologies. The inter-
ventions in this data-driven, system-level discipline are
designed to achieve appropriate, consistent and efﬁcient
delivery of established clinical measures by changing
human performance. They are complex, generally
consisting of multiple, reciprocally interacting elements.
Bydesign,theyevolveovertimeinresponsetocontinuing
feedback, and hence are intrinsically unstable. They are
hard to standardise, since they are most effective when
adapted to the local circumstances. Perhaps most
importantly, they are inherently context-dependent.
Healthcare improvement in this sense is therefore
a hybrid discipline, primarily a science of social change,
and secondarily a clinical or biomedical one.
10e13
Improvement thus operates entirely differently from
the inanimate clinical interventions (tests, drugs,
procedures) that affect biological or physical systems.
Although true experimental methods are sometimes
used to evaluate whether improvement interventions
work, those methods depend on ﬁxed protocols, assume
unidirectional causeeeffect relationships and are
designed to control the inﬂuence of context out of
causal pathways; their use for that purpose is at best
extremely difﬁcult, and at worst inappropriate. A variety
of alternative approaches that draw on economics, social
sciences and other disciplines have therefore emerged
for evaluating improvement programmes.
8 11e15
The introduction of rapid response team systems
(RRTs) serves to illustrate the ways in which these two
Table 1 Systems of survival: the guardian and commercial moral syndromes
Guardian moral syndrome Commercial moral syndrome
< Shun trading
< Exert prowess
< Be obedient and disciplined
< Adhere to tradition
< Respect hierarchy
< Be loyal
< Take vengeance
< Deceive for the sake of the task
< Make rich use of leisure
< Be ostentatious
< Dispense largesse
< Be exclusive
< Show fortitude
< Be fatalistic
< Treasure honour
< Shun force
< Come to voluntary agreements
< Be honest
< Collaborate with strangers
< Compete
< Respect contracts
< Use initiative and enterprise
< Be open to inventiveness and novelty
< Be efﬁcient
< Promote comfort and convenience
< Dissent for the sake of the task
< Invest for productive purposes
< Be industrious
< Be thrifty
< Be optimistic
Table 2 Systems of service: the evangelist and snail moral syndromes
Evangelist moral syndrome Snail moral syndrome
< Take on messy problems
< Respect and include context
< Adapt interventions
< Seek discovery and explanation
< Learn from heterogeneity
< Value learning by trial and error
< Test hypotheses by attempting replication and conﬁrmation
< Seek local impact
< Require application
< Accept credit for the team
< Seek timeliness
< Solve sharply deﬁned problems
< Avoid and control out context
< Adhere strictly to protocols
< Pursue causal relationships
< Strive for homogeneity
< Rely on structured, sequential learning
< Test hypotheses by attempting falsiﬁcation
< Seek generalisability
< Require publication
< Expect personal credit
< Seek timelessness
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The structure of improvement knowledgeepistemological approaches can play out with regard to
the introduction of a clinical innovation. The impetus
for RRT systems arose in the 1990s with the observation
that most of the hospitalised patients who experienced
cardiopulmonary arrest in that era demonstrated signs
and symptoms of physiological deterioration in
the prearrest period that were not recognised or
acted on appropriately. These ﬁndings suggested that
earlier intervention and detection by dedicated teams
with intensive care expertise might reduce cardiac
arrest, mortality, unplanned ICU transfer and other
important adverse clinical outcomes. In response to
this thinking, many hospitals throughout the world
began implementing various versions of RRT systems
despite the lack of formal evaluation of their efﬁcacy and
safety.
Reaction to the relatively rapid implementation of
RRT systems has evolved along two pathways. The ﬁrst,
which might be termed ‘Run, don’t walk’ reﬂects the
palpable frustration of those who become convinced
that the beneﬁts and safety of a particular intervention
are so obvious that delay in its implementation would be
potentially harmful, hence morally suspect. This action-
oriented perspective was expressed as follows in a 2007
editorial: ‘The correct question is: Is there a rationale for
withholding critical care resources from critically ill
patients outside the intensive care unit? The answer is
obvious. No.’
16
The alternative view, described in print as ‘Walk, don’t
run,’ reﬂects the palpable frustration of those who are
convinced that introducing a healthcare intervention
before its efﬁcacy, safety and efﬁciency have been ﬁrmly
established would be potentially wasteful, hence morally
suspect. A 2006 commentary, responding in part to an
earlier published opinion that failure to implement
RRTs was tantamount to malpractice, expressed this
cautionary perspective as follows: ‘In view of the limita-
tions of the evidence and the heterogeneity of study
results, it seems premature to declare Rapid Response
Systems (RRSs) as the standard of care.’
17
THE WAY FORWARD
Jacobs argued that the guardian and commercial moral
syndromes are both essential in sustaining a civilised,
productive public life. She supported her argument by
pointing out, among other things, that when one
syndrome tries to take over the functions of the other in
public life the result is nearly always a distorted, dysfunc-
tional ‘monstrous hybrid.’
6 18 The historical record in
medicine is consistent with that view, since most of the
clinical interventions used during the centuries in which
evangelist epistemology held sway were either ineffective
or harmful or both, and it was only when the methods
of science, including la methode numerique, were intro-
duced that cautionary ‘evidence-based’ (‘authoritative’)
medicine began to temper traditional, action-oriented
‘eminence-based’ (‘authoritarian’) medicine.
19 20
At the same time, however, the historical record indi-
cates that dominance of the snail perspective is not
without problems of its own; the recent history of
thrombolytic therapy is a case in point. The use of
thrombolysis in patients with myocardial infarction
began as early as 1971, and by 1973 ﬁve controlled
studies had convincingly demonstrated that this thera-
peutic approach lowered mortality by about 20%, and
was relatively safe. Despite the early availability of such
strong evidence (thanks, to be sure, to rigorous experi-
mental studies), recommendations for its routine use
did not appear until 14 years later, during which time
clinical researchers carried out an additional 25 rando-
mised clinical studies involving tens of thousands of
patients.
21 It can be argued, therefore, that the seem-
ingly endless preoccupation with studying the efﬁcacy
and safety of thrombolytic therapy was not only unnec-
essary and wasteful, but also delayed its widespread use,
possibly contributing to the loss of many thousands of
lives.
History therefore helps to understand why the evan-
gelist and snail perspectives have been cautious about
embracing each other’s concepts and methods. But if we
accept the premise that both action and caution are
essential systems of service in medicine, the challenge
then becomes how to combine or balance these two
seemingly incompatible approaches. Jacobs suggested
that the only workable relationship between the
guardian and commercial syndromes is a state of
‘symbiosis’ in which the two syndromes remain essen-
tially intact, and their strengths become complementary
by working unceasingly toward close, respectful interac-
tion between them.
6
Such a symbiosis between the evangelist and snail
epistemologies at the moral level is likely to be difﬁcult,
because people are so reluctant to compromise their
moral positions. That said, it should be possible for each
epistemology at least to begin by accepting the reality
that it is neither infallible nor complete unto itself. In
fact, such acceptance may already have begun. Interest-
ingly, although it has not involved formal negotiation,
this coming together appears to be developing in a way
that is analogous to the strategy of principled negotia-
tiondthat is, working from the agreed-upon merits of
principlesdrather than through defence of moral posi-
tions.
5 22 Witness, for example, the recent suggestion by
leading clinical trialists that what has changed in recent
years is not the trials themselves but ‘our recognition of
the complexity of the world in which [randomised trials]
are conceived, funded, carried out, disseminated,
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The structure of improvement knowledgeunderstood, used, and abused,’ as well as increased
awareness of ‘the pitfalls of over-reliance on quantitative
evidence and its limited inﬂuence on healthcare.’
23
It also seems likely that close, respectful interaction
between evangelist and snail epistemologies at the moral
level will be encouraged by softening of hard edges at
the technical level. Here, too, there is evidence that such
softening has begun. Within the snail perspective, for
example, fundamental reconsideration of the roles of
experimental and observational studies in clinical
research has led to the reshaping of evidence into
two mirror-image hierarchies.
7 Many clinical methodol-
ogists also now agree that when baseline measurements
are stable, and an effect size appears to be large (ie,
when the signal/noise ratio is high), controlled trials
may not be required.
24 Formal methods for incorpo-
rating the heterogeneity of patient responses into the
analysis of trials are becoming available.
25 Systematic
reviews are increasingly recognised as tools for under-
standing variation across trials, as well as for validating
efﬁcacy.
26 The fallacy of judging the strength of a study
on the basis of a single element such as randomisation is
being taken seriously.
27 Bayesian methods, which are
logically more robust and do not demand ﬁxed study
protocols, are beginning to replace traditional
frequentist analysis.
28 29 And the overwhelming volume
of controlled trials, many redundant or irrelevant to
clinical practice, has led to calls for discipline in
selecting study topics and streamlining the systematic
review process.
30
Softening at the technical level has begun within the
evangelist perspective (and particularly the improve-
ment community) as well. For example, the opportunity
costs of adopting an intervention prematurely are
becoming recognised more widely.
31 The importance
(and feasibility) of evaluating complex interventions as
early as possible, using the strongest possible study
design, is receiving serious attention
13 (an echo of
Thomas Chalmers’ doctrine of ‘Randomize the ﬁrst
patient when a new therapy becomes availabledyou may
never get another chance!’). Crucial differences among
the kind of measurements needed for improvement,
accountability and research purposes have been well
described,
32 as has the importance of using the appro-
priate primary outcome measurement in evaluating
policy and service interventions.
12 Sophisticated frame-
works for understanding context are emerging.
33 The
PlaneDoeStudyeAct cycle, a formal, system-level
version of experiential learning that encourages
frequent small ‘tests of change,’ is increasingly used as
a bridging strategy between action and caution.
34 And
detailed consensus guidelines for complete, accurate
and transparent reporting of complex improvement
interventions are now available.
35 36
We clearly have a long way to go in achieving mean-
ingful rapprochement between evangelist and snail
moral syndromes. That’s hardly surprising, of course; the
tensions between guardian and commercial moral values
are far from being resolved, despite centuries of trying.
The evidence does suggest, however, that we are devel-
oping the kind of symbiosis between systems of service
that we very much need in order to provide the best
possible care for our Lords, the sick.
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